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Abstract 
Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both 
suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed 
(supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the 
municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a 
theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predic-
tions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The 
estimates based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that 
wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand 
for other types of public employees. Actually wages have no significant effect 
on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.  
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1 Introduction 
Public employment constitutes a large part of total employment in many 
western countries. In 1995, e  g, the average public sector share of total 
employment in the OECD countries was approximately 20 percent, ranging 
from 6 percent in Japan to approximately 30 percent in the Scandinavian coun-
tries.
1 In order to understand how the labor market works, we thus need to 
understand the public labor market, which differs from the private one in 
several aspects. Most important is perhaps the fact that decisions are made by 
politicians and bureaucrats rather than by business leaders.
2 It is far from 
obvious that the first group is motivated by the same objectives as the second 
group; politicians and bureaucrats might, for example, be interested in 
maximizing votes or budgets.
3 This implies that the number of persons em-
ployed in the public sector will not only be based on efficiency and/or equity 
considerations, but that other aspects are important as well. 
In this paper, we will focus on the role of bureaucrats, which we argue is 
double: Bureaucrats are involved in the political process that makes decisions 
about how many people to employ in the public sector at the same time as they 
supply the labor that is employed. In this paper we present a theoretical model 
focusing on this double role of bureaucrats. The implication from the model is 
that increased wages for bureaucrats have smaller effect on labor demand than 
increased wages for other types of bureaucrats. We estimate the model on panel 
data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002 and find evidence that supports 
the theoretical model. 
                                                      
1 The calculation is based on the figures presented in Table 1 in Gregory & Borland (1999). It 
can be noted that Japan was the only country with a share less than 10.  
2 Gregory & Borland (1999) identifies four reasons to why the available control mechanisms are 
not sufficient to restrain politicians and bureaucrats to pursue their own objectives in policy 
making. The first reason is the free-rider problem that occurs since each individual has few 
incentives to collect information needed to monitor the decision makers. Second, incentive-type 
contracts are hard to implement, since it’s hard to measure output in the public sector and since 
the structure of authority is very complex. The third is that competition in the public sector is 
rare. Finally, the two existing control mechanism, voting in elections and voting with your feet, 
are both rather weak; elections for example are only held every fourth year in Sweden. 
3 For a discussion of politicians as vote-maximizers, see, e g, Dixit & Londregan (1996). For a 
discussion of the role of bureaucrats, see, e g, the seminal work by Niskanen (1971). See also 
Mueller (1989, ch 14) for an overview of government and bureaucratic behaviour in public 
choice models. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  4 
That bureaucrats matter for public decision making process is not a new 
idea in the public economy literature.
4 In the most famous work Niskanen 
(1971) argues that bureaucrats are budget-maximizers that take advantage of 
the fact that they i) are the monopolist supplier, ii) know the true cost, and iii) 
are institutionally allowed to make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals, in order 
to increase budgets beyond efficiency. Romer & Rosenthal (1978, 1979) 
develop the monopoly model further, showing that the resulting spending level 
typically is higher than the one preferred by the voters.
5 In the models by 
Niskanen and Romer & Rosenthal, voters and politicians representing the 
voters play an extremely passive role. This might be true for voters, but is 
perhaps not equally likely for politicians. Eavey & Miller (1984) make this 
observation and question whether bureaucrats really are able to just impose an 
outcome on a powerless legislative. Isn’t it rather the case that policy is set in 
negotiations between bureaucrats and politicians representing voters?
6 Using 
experimental data they test these two competing hypothesis and find that the 
situation is better described as a bargaining game.
7 Common to both of these 
types of models of bureaucratic behavior is the assumption that bureaucrats 
care about the size of the budget. Hence, public spending is the variable 
examined. In this paper we focus on public employment, and this makes 
another mechanism important; namely the fact that bureaucrats, involved in the 
decision-making process, actually employ themselves. Hence, we leave the ad-
hoc assumption of budget-maximizing bureaucrats and instead model bureau-
cratic behavior based on constrained utility maximization.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present our theo-
retical model. Section 3 discusses the data and some Swedish institutional facts 
and Section 4 present the empirical specification of the theoretical model. In 
Section 5 we present the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
                                                      
4 That bureaucrats matter for the political decision making process as well as in the 
implementation phase is long recognized by the political science literature, see e g Peters (1995).  
5 Romer & Rosenthal (1982) test the model on school budgets in Oregon and find that school 
budgets that are from 16.5 to 43.6 percent higher than the budget preferred by the median voter 
pass referenda.  
6 See also Breton & Wintrobe (1975) and Miller (1977) for models describing the bargaining 
game between politicians and bureaucrats. 
7 Kalseth & Rattsø (1998) use this bargaining model when investigating the pattern of 
administrative spending in Norwegian municipalities. They find that the strength of the 
incumbents’ control over the municipal council plays a crucial role for administrative spending; 
the weaker the government is the higher is administrative spending. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  5 
2 Theoretical  model 
The purpose of this section is to present a model of bureaucratic behavior that 
does not rest on any ad-hoc assumption of preferences for large budgets. The 
model we suggest bears similarities to the model in Courant, Gramlich & 
Rubinfeld (1979) where the level of public spending is linked to public 
employee market power. In our model the behavior of bureaucrats, as well as 
other agents, is based on constrained utility maximization. The mechanism 
causing the preferences of bureaucrats to differ from others is that they both 
supply and demand public labor; the supply side is when they as individuals 
decide to work in the public sector at given wages and the demand side is when 
they as bureaucrats in the municipalities influence how many workers the 
municipality shall employ. 
In the model it is assumed that each individual i gets utility from private 
consumption (Ci) and per capita spending of two publicly provided private 
goods (e
nb and e
b). For simplicity we assume that the publicly provided goods 
are perfectly matched with personnel requirements and that for one of the 
goods we need non-bureaucratic personnel and for the other bureaucratic per-
sonnel. Each individual maximizes the utility function 
 




subject to two budget constraints; their individual budget constraint
8 
 
(2)  Ci = (1 - t)wi 
 
and the municipality’s budget constraint 
 






where t is the local income tax, wi is the individual’s annual wage income, N is 
the population in the municipality, w  is average annual wage in the munici-
pality, G is intergovernmental grants, E
nb is the number of non-bureaucrats em-
                                                      
8 In the empirical part of the paper, we will estimate the model using data from Sweden. 
Equation (2) and (3) are therefore the proper specifications of the budget constraints since all 
taxes raised at the municipal level in Sweden come from proportional income taxation. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  6 
ployed by the municipality, E
b is the number of bureaucrats employed by the 
municipality, and w
nb and w
b is each group’s annual wage rate. 
Solving for t in equation (3) and substituting into equation (2) yields 
 




b) + τig 
 
where τi is voter i’s tax price, given by wi/w , i e, the price that voter i must pay 
for a marginal increase in personnel and e and g denotes E and G expressed in 
per capita terms. We assume that the utility function in (1) is given by a Cobb-
Douglas function:  
 
(5) 
3 2 1 θ θ θ b nb e e aC U =   
 
In line with the earlier literature, we argue that there are two groups of 
people that are important in the municipal decision making process; politicians 
and bureaucrats. Politicians make the final decisions, whereas bureaucrats 
prepare and propose budgets.  
Starting with the first group, politicians, we assume that their optimal 
demand function for municipal personnel is given by the decisive voter’s pref-
erences. Typically, it is assumed that the median voter is decisive and that the 
median voter can be identified as the voter with median income. However, 
assuming that the median voter is decisive is problematic when we are dealing 
with a multi-dimensional policy space. Instead, we will use a representative 
voter model, where we characterize the representative voter as the voter with 
mean income and assume that he or she is not employed in the municipal 
sector. Maximizing equation (5) subject to equation (4) yields the following 
first-order condition for each voter; 
 
(6)  lne
nb = ln(θ2/(θ1 + θ2)) - lnτiw




b = ln(θ3/(θ1 + θ3)) - lnτiw




The representative voter’s first-order conditions are thus given by 
 
(8)  lne
nb = ln(θ2/(θ1 + θ2)) - lnw




b = ln(θ3/(θ1 + θ3)) - lnw
b + ln(w  + g - w
nbe
nb) 
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Using equation (9) to substitute for e
b in equation (8), yields the representative 
voter’s optimal demand function for non-bureaucrats: 
 
(10)  lne
nb = constant – lnw
nb + ln(w  + g) 
 
Analogously, the representative voter’s optimal demand function for bureau-
crats is given by: 
 
(11)  lne
b = constant – lnw
b + ln(w  + g) 
 
Note that the demand functions are identical for bureaucratic personnel and 
non-bureaucratic personnel (except for the wage rate for the two types of 
employees). Differentiating equations (10) and (11) with respect to the voter’s 
income (i e with respect to w  + g) yields a positive sign, implying that the 
richer the voter is, the more public employees does he or she demand. Differ-
entiating equations (10) and (11) with respect to the wage rate of those 
employed by the municipality (i.e. with respect to w
nb and w
b) yields a negative 
sign, implying that the more expensive the publicly provided good gets, the less 
of it does the representative voter demand.  
Let us next turn to the other group that is important in the municipal 
decision-making process, the bureaucrats. Their demand functions, corre-




nb = constant – lnτbw
nb + ln(w
b + τig) 
(13)  lne
b = constant – lnτbw
b + ln(w
b + τig) 
 
The bureaucrats’ demand function for non-bureaucrats, given in equation (12), 
is hence very similar to that of the representative voter. Comparing from equa-
tion (10), we note that they only differ in the tax prices; while the representa-
tive voter faces a tax price of one, the bureaucrat faces a tax price of w
b/w . 
Differentiation of equation (12) with respect to the wage or the income variable 
yields however the same sign on the derivatives as for the representative voter. 
The interesting thing to note is however the bureaucrats’ demand function for 
bureaucrats; now, a marginal increase in the bureaucrats’ wage rate not only IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  8 
ends up as a cost variable but also as an income variable.
9 So, differentiating 
equation (13) with respect to the wage rate yields an undefined sign on the 
derivative.  
So whose preferences is it that will be implemented, the politicians’ or the 
bureaucrats’? Well, that will depend on the political strength of the two groups. 
If the bureaucrats have no power in the negotiation with the politicians, the 
effective optimal demand function for the number of bureaucrats employed in 
the municipality will be given by equation (11). If the bureaucrats have all the 
power (as in Niskanen type models), the optimal demand function for the 
number of bureaucrats will look like in equation (13). If both groups have some 
power, the optimal demand function will lie somewhere in between. That is, if 
the bureaucrats have some bargaining power, we would expect an increase in 
the bureaucrats’ wage rate to have a smaller impact on the number of bureau-
crats than the effect from an increase in the non-bureaucrats wage rate on the 
number of non-bureaucrats. We would also expect that this effect will be 




3  Data and institutional background 
In Sweden, approximately 35 percent of all employed persons are employed in 
the public sector, and most of those publicly employed work in the local 
sector
11: Figure 1 reveals that 30 percent of all employed are employed by the 
total local sector, approximately 20 percent are employed by the municipalities, 
and approximately 5 percent are employed by the state.  
 
 
                                                      
9 In real world there exists payroll taxes, but we have here chosen to ignore these. Including them 
do not change the predictions from the model. 
10 Note that the theoretical model imposes unit elasticities for the demand of both non-
bureaucrats and bureaucrats. 
11 The local government sector in Sweden is made up of 290 municipalities and 21 counties. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  9 









































Source: Statistics, Sweden 
 
Municipal employment can be divided into six sectors; child care, care for 
elderly, other care, schooling
12, technique and administration. These sectors 
also correspond to the municipalities’ main responsibilities. Figure 2 shows the 
relative sizes of the number of personnel in each sector.
13 From the figure we 
can note that old care, schooling and child care constitute the largest shares, 
whereas other care is the sector with fewest employees. Furthermore we can 
note that approximately 8 percent of the municipal employees are employed in 
administration. The administrative staff can be divided into three groups; prin-
cipals, case workers and clerical staff. In the empirical application we will use 
administrative staff as a measure of bureaucrats, even though not all persons 






                                                      
12 Including leisure activities. 
13 In 1991 teachers became a municipal responsibility and in 1992 parts of the personnel in 
elderly care that earlier had been a responsibility for the counties became a municipal 
responsibility. 
14 Ideally one would want to divide the administrative staff into smaller components where one 
could separate the group that can be called “bureaucrats” according to our theoretical model from 
others. This is however not possible. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  10















Source: The Swedish Association of Local Authorities 
 
In this paper we will contrast the demand for administrative staff with the 
demand for employees in the three largest sectors; child care, schooling and 
care for elderly.
15 We will do this using panel data on the number of full-time 
equivalents per 1000 inhabitants for the period 1990–2002
16. From the theoreti-
cal model we expect wages to enter differently in the demand for administra-
tive staff than for other municipal employees.  
There are at least two reasons why Swedish municipalities constitute a good 
testing ground when analyzing topics related to the public sector labor market. 
First, municipalities in Sweden have a high degree of local self-government: 
They set their own taxes, have the statutory right to borrow, decide how much 
to spend on the services that they are responsible for (above a certain minimum 
                                                      
15 We have also tried to contrast the demand for administrative staff with the demand for non-
administrative staff, combining all the other sectors into one. However, the specification tests 
rejected that the model for non-administrative staff was correctly specified. Hence, it seems 
important to separate between different types of municipal services. 
16 The period we study is an extremely turbulent period in the Swedish labor market: Leaving the 
1980s on a high note, with an overall unemployment rate of approximately 2 percent, the early 
1990s saw a deep recession with unemployment rates reaching 9 percent, a level that for the last 
century only could be matched by the deep recession of the 1930s. And then, from approximately 
the mid 1990s and onwards, we have once again seen better times. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  11 
required level), and determine how much personnel to employ within each of 
the sectors for which they are responsible. Second, the Swedish municipalities 
meet the same institutional set-up, giving us a large sample of cross-sections, 
which makes it easier to get a correctly specified model.  
In order to explain the demand for municipal labor demand we use wages in 
each sector, grants from the central government, municipal tax base, and 
demographic structure in the municipality. Summary statistics as well as exact 
definitions are given in the appendix. 
 
 
4 Empirical  specification 
Section 2 gave us a theoretical specification of the demand equation (equations 
(10)-(13)). Our empirical specification of the demand equation is given by: 
 
() it t i it it it it it it f X w g y n n ε ι δ ρ β α λ + + + + + + + − = − ln ln ln ln 1 ln 1 (14) 
 
where  it n is the number of employed persons per capita in municipality i  in 
year t  in a specific sector,  it y  is the mean taxable income in the municipality, 
it g  is per capita intergovernmental grants received by the municipality,  it w  is 
the (monthly average) wage rate received by those employed by the 
municipality (differentiated by sector),  it X  is a vector of other explanatory 
variables that might be important in the determination of  it n ,  fi is a 
municipality-specific fixed effect, ιt  are time dummies, and  it ε  is an error 
term. Employment, income, grants and wages are in logarithms, so the esti-
mated parameters α , β  and  ρ  are elasticities. 
The econometric specification differs in four respects from the theoretical 
specification. First, to minimize problems with potential omitted variable bias, 
we control for other observable characteristics of the municipalities that might 
affect the demand for municipal personnel ( it X ) as well as for unobserved 
characteristics of the municipality that remains stable over time and that might 
affect municipal employment ( ) i f , and for unobserved variables that affects all 
municipalities in the same way in a given year ( ) t ι .  IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  12
Second, we allow for a dynamic adjustment in municipal employment. The 
reason for allowing for dynamics is that earlier studies in the literature on local 
public expenditures indicate a dynamic behavior of Swedish local governments 
(see, e.g. Dahlberg & Johansson, 1998, 2000; and Dahlberg & Lindström, 
1998). This is probably especially important when considering personnel since 
the municipalities may not adjust labor freely; due to labor market regulations 
and hiring costs we would expect actual employment to deviate from the one 
optimal in a static framework. Following earlier literature (see, e g, Borge & 
Rattsø, 1993) we have therefore introduced dynamics by allowing for a partial 
adjustment rule. The relationship between the desired ( )
*
it n  and the actual () it n  
level of employment is formulated as a partial adjustment process. The actual 




1 − − − = − it it it it n n n n λ      (15) 
 
Third, we allow the two income variables (average income and grants) to 
have heterogeneous effects on municipal employment. That they have different 
effects on expenditures have been shown in many empirical studies (see the lit-
erature on “flypaper effects”, e g Bailey & Connolly, 1998), and Bergström, 
Dahlberg & Mörk (2004) also find that they have different effects on municipal 
employment. 
Fourth, we leave the theoretical prediction of unit elasticities and allow the 
elasticities to differ from one.  
Since we have both a lagged dependent variable and municipality-specific 
fixed effects in the regressions we need to use an IV-estimator (OLS estimation 
yields biased estimates, see Nickell, 1981). Furthermore, to take care of the 
potential simultaneity problem between employment and wages, we also in-
strument the wage variable. We will use the GMM estimator of the type devel-
oped and suggested by Anderson & Hsiao (1981) and estimate the model in 
first-differences, using the second and third lag of the employment and the first 
and second lag of wages as instruments for the lagged dependent variable and IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  13 
the potentially endogenous wage variable. We will use the Sargan test for 





5.1 Baseline  estimates 
The baseline estimates are presented in Table 1. Before turning to the pa-
rameter estimates, it can be worth noting that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid/the model is correctly specified for 
any of the four sectors; as is clear from the last row in the table, the Sargan sta-
tistic is well below the critical value.
18  
Starting with the results for the variable of main interest, it is clear that the 
wage rate is an important variable in the determination of the number of per-
sonnel in all sectors but administration. For child care and schooling, the wage 
rate enters statistically as well as economically significant; an increase in the 
wage rate with one percent decreases the number of personnel in the child care 
sector with 1.4 percent and the number of personnel in the school sector with 
1.3 percent. For care for the elderly, the effect seems to be economically 
important (with an elasticity of minus 0.9), even though the point estimate is 
imprecisely estimated. For administrative personnel, on the other hand, the 
wage rate seems to be an unimportant determinant; not only is it statistically in-
significant, it also seems to be economically unimportant (with an elasticity of 
minus 0.1). These results are well in line with the predictions from the 
theoretical model. 
Turning to the other explanatory variables, it is clear that dynamics and the 
size of a municipality are important determinants for the number of personnel 
in all sectors. The lagged dependent variable enters significantly and with a 
positive sign for all sectors, and the results for the density variable indicates 
                                                      
17 The Sargan test is a test of the general model specification, but it is generally interpreted in the 
empirical literature as a test for instrument validity. The Sargan statistic is given by 
2 R N × , 
where R
2 is the uncentered R
2 from the regression of the two-stage least squares residuals on the 
instruments andN  the number of observations. The degrees of freedom are as many as there are 
overidentifying restrictions. 
18 In our case, the critical value at the 5 percent significance level is 5.99. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  14
that there are economies of scale; the larger a municipality is, the smaller is the 
number of personnel per capita in all sectors.
19 
20 
Looking at the income variables, we reach the somewhat surprising conclu-
sion that they do not seem to matter in the determination of municipal 
employment. Starting with the average taxable income in the municipality (the 
tax base), we get both statistically and economically insignificant results. Even 
more surprising is perhaps that grants seem to be so economically unimportant, 
with a point estimate of the elasticity that in all respects must be considered as 
zero, even thought it is statistically significant in two of the four cases. These 
results are however in line with the results obtained in Bergström et al. (2004).  
Finally, the demographic structure in the municipality seems to be an im-
portant determinant, at least for child care and care for the elderly, and it seems 
to be reasonably signed; the more potential users there are, the higher is the 
number of personnel per capita (i e, the more children there is in the age 0-6 
and the more persons there are in the age 80 and above, the more personnel per 
capita there is in the sectors for child care and care for the elderly). However, 
somewhat surprisingly, the number of children in the age 7-19 does not seem to 
affect the number of teachers per capita. 
According to the theoretical specification of the demand equation, there are 
no cross-wage effects. It may nevertheless be an interesting question whether 
wage changes in the administrative sector affect the number of persons 
employed in other sectors: One hypothesis is that increased wage-costs for 
administrative staff leads to savings, and hence fewer employees, in the other 
sectors. Including cross-wage effects can therefore be seen as a test of the 
theoretical specification. From the cross-wage elasticities in Table 2, it is clear 
that wages for administrative personnel do not affect the demand for other 
types of labor. It can also be noted that the results for the other variables are 
unaffected by the inclusion of the administrative wage rate. These results hence 
support the use of a Cobb-Douglas utility function, since this specification lead 
to demand equations without cross-wage effects. 
                                                      
19 Note that in a first-differenced specification, the density variable has the same interpretation as 
a population variable (since the number of square kilometres stays constant over time for all 
municipalities). 
20 We have also investigated whether the determinants of labor demand are different in larger 
municipalities (population larger than 50 000 or 100 000) by letting the impact of wages, grants 
and tax base differ for these municipalities. Our results, that are available upon request, indicate 
no such differences. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  15 
Table 1. Determinants of municipal employment in different sectors 
  Administration  Child care  Care for 
elderly 
Schooling 
Lagged empl  0.6637 0.5624 1.0652 0.5870 
  (0.1169)** (0.0695)** (0.1585)** (0.1376)** 
Wage (own)  -0.1346 -1.4010 -0.9141 -1.2830 
  (0.4076) (0.5431)**  (1.0444) (0.3143)** 
Grants  -0.0075 0.0175  -0.0373 0.0029 
  (0.0086) (0.0066)**  (0.0149)*  (0.0061) 
Tax base  0.1092 0.1686 -0.0706  -0.0027 
  (0.1266) (0.1020) (0.2083) (0.0870) 
Age 0-6  0.1487 0.1927 0.2350 0.0863 
  (0.0923) (0.0729)**  (0.1541) (0.0632) 
Age 7-15  -0.0171 0.1499  -0.2804 0.0493 
  (0.1233) (0.0956) (0.2046) (0.1005) 
Age 16-19  -0.0804 0.0484  -0.1259 -0.0539 
  (0.0553) (0.0440) (0.0909) (0.0411) 
Age 80  0.0090 0.1004 0.3418 0.0802 
  (0.0771) (0.0606) (0.1234)**  (0.0575) 
Density  -0.7934 -1.0351 -1.1823 -1.2666 
  (0.1413)** (0.1136)** (0.2353)** (0.1170)** 
Constant  -0.0312 0.0923  -0.3531 0.1668 
  (0.0463) (0.0588) (0.1073)**  (0.0456)** 
Sargan  2.97 0.54 2.43 4.32 
Notes: Wage (own) indicates that the wage variable is sector-specific in each regres-
sion. Lagged employment, wages, grants and tax base are in logarithms, so the 
parameter estimates are elasticities. Time dummies and municipality specific fixed 
effects are included in the estimations.  Standard errors in parentheses. * (**) denotes 
significance at the 5 percent (1 percent) level. Lagged employment and own wage are 
instrumented. Employment lagged two and three years and wages lagged one and two 
years are used as instruments.  IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  16
Table 2. Municipal labor demand; controlling for wages in administration 
  Child care  Care for elderly  Schooling 
Lagged employment  0.5561 1.0666 0.5817 
  (0.0697)** (0.1576)** (0.1373)** 
Wage (own)  -1.3851 -1.0482 -1.2713 
  (0.5476)* (1.0740)  (0.3181)** 
Wage (administration)  -0.1267 0.3201  0.0448 
  (0.0828) (0.1947) (0.0704) 
Grants  0.0173 -0.0370  0.0030 
  (0.0066)** (0.0148)*  (0.0061) 
Tax base  0.1764 -0.0854  -0.0055 
  (0.1010) (0.2075) (0.0868) 
Age 0-6  0.1991 0.2256 0.0842 
  (0.0732)** (0.1531)  (0.0630) 
Age 7-15  0.1561 -0.2925  0.0492 
  (0.0951) (0.2047) (0.1010) 
Age 16-19  0.0491 -0.1281  -0.0537 
  (0.0438) (0.0910) (0.0410) 
Age 80  0.1052 0.3276 0.0770 
  (0.0603) (0.1232)**  (0.0568) 
Density  -1.0277 -1.1920 -1.2661 
  (0.1137)** (0.2353)** (0.1172)** 
Constant  0.1028 -0.3718  0.1608 
  (0.0553) (0.1029)**  (0.0431)** 
Sargan   0.54  2.16  4.32 
Notes: Wage (own) indicates that the wage variable is sector-specific in each regres-
sion. Lagged employment, wages, grants and tax base are in logarithms, so the 
parameter estimates are elasticities. Time dummies and municipality specific fixed 
effects are included in the estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. * (**) denotes 
significance at the 5 percent (1 percent) level. Lagged employment and own wage are 
instrumented. Employment lagged two and three years and wages lagged one and two 
years are used as instruments.  
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5.2  Controlling for political strength 
We have in this paper implicitly assumed that the level of public employment 
is set through a bargaining process between politicians and bureaucrats. One 
component that ought to be important for the employment outcome is therefore 
the relative bargaining strength of the two groups. Evidence in Kalseth & 
Rattsø (1998) supports this view. In this section, we will therefore examine 
whether relative bargaining strength matters. 
One factor that might affect bargaining strength is experience. Politicians 
are elected every third or fourth year whereas the pool of bureaucrats remains 
more or less the same over time. Given that there is a change of power in con-
nection with an election, new politicians enter the scene and must negotiate 
with experienced bureaucrats. This means that bureaucrats might have larger 
bargaining power in municipalities where there has been a change in power in 
the last election. In order to empirically investigate this, we divide the sample 
into municipalities that have “new-at-office politicians” and municipalities that 
have “re-elected politicians” and estimate the model separately for the two 
groups. The results are given in the first two columns of Table 3. In addition, 
we estimate a model where we allow the wage-parameter to be different for the 
two groups by interacting the bureaucrats’ wage variable with a dummy 
variable that, after each election, takes the value one if the municipality got 
“new-at-office politicians”, zero otherwise.
21 These results are given in the last 
column of Table 3. As is clear from the results, there is no significant effect 
from being new at office. That is, bureaucrats do not seem to be more powerful 
in negotiations with politicians that are new at office compared to the case 
when they meet more experienced politicians (in the sense that the politicians 
was re-elected in the last election). 
In addition to the measure of bargaining strength used above, we also ex-
amine three other measures of the politicians’ strength. First, we calculate the 
distance between the vote-shares of the two political blocs in the last election. 
If the distance is large, i e the election was not tight, we assume that the politi-
cians are strong. Second, we compute the Herfindahl index which is inversely 
                                                      
21 In our theoretical model we argue that the main difference between administrative staff and 
politicians/voters is the way wages for administrative personnel enters the demand equations. It 
is therefore natural to assume that wages will have different impact depending on the bargaining 
strength of the politicians; the stronger the politicians are, the less influence do bureaucrats have, 
and the more negative will the wage elasticity be. IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  18
related to party fragmentation; the higher the index is, the less fragmented is 
the party structure in the municipal council and the stronger do we assume that 
politicians are.
22 Finally, we have looked at how many times the political 
power has changed during the period 1974–2002. The fewer turnovers there 
have been, the stronger are the politicians assumed to be.
23 In what way shall 
these power-measures enter the demand equation? In Kalseth & Rattsø (1998) 
it is assumed that political strength affects the level of administrative spending; 
the stronger the politicians are the smaller is spending on administration. 
Following them, we have first let the distance variable and the Herfindahl in-
dex enter directly as own regressors in the estimations.
24 These results are pre-
sented in the first two columns in Table 4. Second, arguing in the same line as 
for the “new-at-office” case, we have interacted these measures of political 
strength with the wage variable. Results are given in Table 4. We see from the 
table that nothing happens when controlling for political strength; both the 
intercepts (the first two columns), and the interaction parameters (the last three 




                                                      












. If one party holds all the seats, the index 
takes the value 1 and if the seats are equally distributed between P parties, the index takes the 
value 1/P. The Herfindahl index is used as a measure of political strength by, e g, Kalseth & 
Rattsø (1998). 
23 However, it could also be the case that politicians that are secure in their position (had a strong 
majority in the last election or have not experienced any turnovers in the past) do not need to 
bother as much about the implemented policy in order to satisfy the voters. 
24 Since turnover is constant over time, we cannot separate the effect from this variable from the 
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Table 3. Demand for administrative personnel; controlling for whether 
the politicians are new at office 
 “New-at-office”  “Re-elected”  Full  sample 
Lag 0.6135**  0.7080**  0.6617** 
  (0.1997)  (0.1504) (0.1186) 
Wage (adm)  -0.3827  -0.1559  -0.1617 
 (0.6587)  (0.5110)  (0.4130) 
Wage*new-at-office     0.0057 
     (0.0039) 
Grants -  0.0019  -0.0114  -0.0078 
 (0.0135)  (0.0113)  (0.0087) 
Tax base  0.0594  0.1319  0.1144 
 (0.2210)  (0.1623)  (0.1281) 
Age 0-6  0.1915  0.1433  0.1557 
 (0.1459)  (0.1202)  (0.0936) 
Age 7-15  0.2002  -0.1191  0.0049 
 (0.2003)  (0.1582)  (0.1252) 
Age 16-19  -0.0475  -0.1072  -0.0860 
 (0.0865)  (0.0731)  (0.0562) 
Age 80  0.2188  -0.0828  0.0111 
 (0.1402)  (0.0962)  (0.0780) 
Density -0.7894**  -0.8443**  -0.8254** 
 (0.2625)  (0.1799)  (0.1448) 
Constant -0.0587 -0.0419  -0.0404 
 (0.0603)  (0.0480)  (0.0383) 
Sargan 0.3796  3.8566  4.053 
Notes: Lagged employment, wages, grants and tax base are in logarithms, so the 
parameter estimates are elasticities. Time dummies and municipality specific fixed 
effects are included in the estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. * (**) denotes 
significance at the 5 percent (1 percent) level. Lagged employment and own wage are 
instrumented. Employment lagged two and three years and wages lagged one and two 
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Table 4. Demand for administrative personnel; controlling for the 
political strength of the politicians 
 Distance  Herfindahl  Distance Herfindahl  Turnover 
Lag  0.6618 0.6641 0.6630 0.6632 0.6588 
  (0.1166)** (0.1169)** (0.1167)** (0.1169)** (0.1170)** 
Pol strength  -0.0002 0.0332     
  (0.0003) (0.0865)    
Wage (adm.)  -0.1249 -0.1358 -0.1777 -0.1363 -0.1465 
  (0.4081) (0.4078) (0.4133) (0.4071) (0.4056) 
Wage*strength    -0.0050 0.0017  -0.0132 
     (0.0069) (0.0630) (0.0613) 
Grants  -0.0074 -0.0074 -0.0071 -0.0075 -0.0075 
  (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
Tax base  0.1121 0.1086 0.1123 0.1078 0.1125 
  (0.1266) (0.1267) (0.1268) (0.1268) (0.1270) 
Age 0-6  0.1505 0.1478 0.1457 0.1491 0.1479 
  (0.0923) (0.0924) (0.0922) (0.0924) (0.0921) 
Age 7-15  -0.0154 -0.0176 -0.0158 -0.0184 -0.0162 
  (0.1232) (0.1234) (0.1234) (0.1235) (0.1233) 
Age 16-19  -0.0804 -0.0812 -0.0829 -0.0794 -0.0803 
  (0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0555) (0.0555) (0.0554) 
Age 80  0.0082 0.0095 0.0120 0.0099 0.0090 
  (0.0770) (0.0771) (0.0773) (0.0772) (0.0769) 
Density  -0.7969 -0.7938 -0.7855 -0.7927 -0.7946 
  (0.1414)** (0.1413)** (0.1418)** (0.1413)** (0.1416)** 
Constant  -0.0328 -0.0310 -0.0265 -0.0308 -0.0297 
  (0.0464) (0.0463) (0.0469) (0.0463) (0.0461) 
Sargan  2.702  2.9722 2.9722 6.4848 4.053 
Notes: Strong politicians are assumed when Distance > 0.18, Herfindahl > 0.28 and 
Turnover < 2. Lagged employment, wages, grants and tax base are in logarithms, so the 
parameter estimates are elasticities. Time dummies and municipality specific fixed 
effects are included in the estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. * (**) denotes IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  21 
significance at the 5 percent (1 percent) level. Lagged employment and own wage are 
instrumented. Employment lagged two and three years and wages lagged one and two 
years are used as instruments.  
 
 
6 Summary  and  concluding remarks 
In this paper we have argued that bureaucrats in the government sector have a 
double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment. 
A theoretical model has been presented focusing on this aspect. The theoretical 
model provides the predictions that an increase in the municipal wage rate in 
any sector will lead to a decrease in the number of personnel in that sector. This 
is however not the case for the bureaucrats. The theoretical prediction of the 
wage effect for this sector is that the sign is ambiguous; it can have a positive 
effect, a negative effect or no effect at all. The reason for this is that bureau-
crats, which have an important say in designing the policy, do not have the 
same incentives to react to higher wages by cutting employments, since these 
wages corresponds to their own income. It is worth noticing that the mecha-
nism we describe in this paper may well be relevant for private sector employ-
ment as well; also in the private sector there exists administrative personnel 
that can be assumed to bargain with business leader representing the share-
holders over the firm’s labor demand. 
Using panel data for Swedish municipalities over the period 1990–2002 we 
have estimated municipal labor demand functions for administration, child 
care, care for the elderly and schooling. It turns out that the predictions from 
the theoretical model are supported by the empirical analysis; the wage rate has 
a significant (in a statistical and/or economical sense) and negative effect in all 
sectors but the administrative one. For the administrative sector, the wage rate 
seems to have no effect, neither in a statistical nor in an economical sense. This 
result could of course also turn up if the bureaucrats have no power and the 
politicians’ demand for bureaucrats is inelastic. We do however not think that 
this scenario is very likely; our interpretation of the results is, along the lines of 
the theoretical model, that the bureaucrats’ role in the local government’s deci-
sion making process affects the demand function for administrative personnel. 
Other empirical results that might be worth highlighting are the negligible 
effects that increases in intergovernmental grants and average income in the 
municipalities have on municipal employment; they seem to be unimportant in 
both a statistical and an economical sense. The results for grants are well in line IFAU – Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats  22
with the results in Bergström et al (2004). Further research is needed in order 
to understand why income seems to be so unimportant for municipal labor 
demand. 
Given that municipal labor demand is decided over in a bargaining game 
between politicians and bureaucrats, the groups’ respective bargaining strength 
ought to be important. One way to capture this is through the politicians’ politi-
cal strength. Examining this, it turns out that different measures of political 
strength do not seem to be of any importance. Maybe a more thorough model-
ing of the bargaining game is needed in order to correctly specify political 
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Appendix 
The data-set is obtained from Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Association 
of Local Authorities, and consists of a panel of Swedish municipalities over 
the years 1990–2002. Out of the existing 290 municipalities 14 were discarded 
for the following reasons: 
i)  Newly created/split municipalities: 140, 181, 330 480, 
461, 488, 1583, 1535, 1880 and 1814 
ii)  Outlier: 382 
iii)  Municipalities that handle tasks not normally handled by 
municipalities: 980, 1280 and 1480. 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  St  dev  Min  Max 
Employment,  administration  5.32 1.01 2.21 12.71 
Employment, child care  11.38  2.25  3.67  24.11 
Employment, care for elderly  18.12  6.79  2.90  38.60 
Employment,  schooling  14.87  4.33 0.64 31.29 
Wages, administration  15 988  3 191.5  10 150  26 139 
Wages, child care  12 837  2 411.8  8 366.9  18 778 
Wages, care for elderly  12 577  2 307.4  8 611.9  19 357 
Wages, schooling  16 333  3 020.4  8 820.2  23 302 
Grants  7 828.5  3 554.4  -11 675  23 194 
Tax  base  828.39 215.13 374.50 2  349.9 
Age0-6  8.72 1.26 4.74 13.05 
Age7-15  11.61  1.29 6.46 16.43 
Age16-19  5.04 0.60 2.81 8.92 
Age80+  5.01 1.35 1.04 8.89 
Density  114.33 389.19 0.26  4  006.3 
Note: For definitions, see the following page 
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Definitions of variables: 
Municipal employment: Number of full-time equivalences per 1000 inhabi-
tants (people employed on hourly bases are excluded). In 1998 there was a 
change in the definition of full-time equivalences. This variable is available for 
administration, school and leisure, child care and care for elderly separately.  
Wages: Total sum of wages paid in the municipality divided with number of 
full time equivalences (people employed on hourly bases are excluded). This 
variable is available for administration, school and leisure, child care and care 
for elderly separately. 
Grants: Intergovernmental grants from the central government to the munici-
pality per inhabitant. 
Tax base: Municipal tax base, 100 SEK per inhabitant. Measured in January 1
st 
Age0-6: Percent of the population younger than 6, in January 1
st.  
Age7-15: Percent of the population older than 6 but younger than 16, in Janu-
ary 1
st. 
Age16-19: Percent of the population older than 15 but younger than 19, in 
January 1
st. 
Age80+: Percent of the population older than 80, in January 1
st. 
Density: Inhabitants per square kilometer, in January 1
st. 
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